Privacy, Parental Rights, Section 1983, and the Future of Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment
By Sally Vazquez-Castellanos, Esq.
Published on Sunday, June 21, 2026 at approximately 10:37 pm.
This evening, my chat with generative AI took me from parental rights and grandparent visitation to abortion, privacy, substantive due process, and one of the most important constitutional questions of our time:
Who decides?
Who decides how children are raised?
Who decides whether a family remains intact?
Who decides reproductive choices?
Who decides what information, beliefs, and influences enter the minds of our children?
And perhaps most importantly, who decides where the boundary lies between individual liberty and government authority?
These questions are not new. They have occupied American courts for more than a century. Yet in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, they have taken on renewed significance.
While Dobbs is often discussed solely as an abortion case, its broader importance lies in what it reveals about the Court’s evolving understanding of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.
For those of us who follow parental rights, privacy, technology, and government power, Dobbs raises questions that extend far beyond reproductive rights.
The Constitutional Family Tree
For decades, constitutional scholars frequently taught a connected line of cases involving personal autonomy and privacy:
- Meyer v. Nebraska
- Pierce v. Society of Sisters
- Griswold v. Connecticut
- Eisenstadt v. Baird
- Roe v. Wade
- Troxel v. Granville
- Lawrence v. Texas
- Obergefell v. Hodges
Although each case addressed different facts, they shared a common principle:
Certain personal decisions are so fundamental that government interference requires constitutional scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that parents possess a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children. Troxel v. Granville reaffirmed that principle when the Court invalidated a Washington statute that allowed courts to override the decisions of fit parents regarding grandparent visitation.
The Court’s message was clear:
Government does not possess unlimited authority to substitute its judgment for that of a fit parent.
For family law practitioners, Troxel remains one of the most significant parental-rights decisions of the modern era.
Enter Dobbs
Dobbs altered the constitutional landscape.
The Court concluded that the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion and overruled Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
The majority emphasized that unenumerated constitutional rights must be deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.
Supporters of Dobbs view the decision as a return to constitutional text and democratic self-government.
Critics view it as a contraction of personal liberty and privacy protections previously recognized by the Court.
Regardless of one’s position, Dobbs forces us to confront a difficult question:
If constitutional protection for abortion could disappear, what does that mean for other liberty interests derived from the Fourteenth Amendment?
The Roberts Concurrence
One of the most overlooked aspects of Dobbs is Chief Justice John Roberts’ concurrence.
Roberts agreed that Mississippi’s law could be upheld.
He disagreed, however, with the majority’s decision to completely overrule Roe and Casey.
His approach reflected a traditional principle of judicial restraint:
If a case can be decided narrowly, courts should avoid deciding more than necessary.
Roberts would have upheld the Mississippi law while leaving broader constitutional questions unresolved.
Whether one agrees with his position or not, the concurrence represents an alternative constitutional path—one that may have produced fewer ripple effects throughout substantive due process jurisprudence.
For lawyers litigating parental-rights cases, that distinction matters.
The constitutional foundations supporting parental autonomy remain intact today, but the broader doctrinal conversation surrounding unenumerated rights has undeniably changed.
Troxel and Section 1983
This brings us to an issue I discussed in a recent article examining Troxel and Section 1983.
When government officials interfere with the parent-child relationship, constitutional concerns arise.
Examples may include:
- Knowingly false allegations.
- Fabricated evidence.
- Improper investigations.
- Retaliatory actions.
- Interference with custody or visitation rights.
- Actions taken without adequate procedural safeguards.
When state actors deprive individuals of constitutional rights under color of law, Section 1983 provides a potential mechanism for seeking relief.
The constitutional injury is not merely procedural.
It may involve interference with one of the oldest recognized liberty interests in American constitutional law—the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.
That principle remains firmly embedded within Supreme Court precedent.
Yet the post-Dobbs environment invites renewed examination of how courts define and protect liberty interests generally.
Privacy Beyond Reproduction
Perhaps the most important lesson of Dobbs is that privacy is no longer discussed as a single constitutional concept.
For decades, privacy jurisprudence was often viewed as an interconnected body of law governing family formation, marriage, contraception, intimate relationships, and reproductive decisions.
Dobbs fractured that framework.
The majority distinguished abortion from other privacy-related decisions by emphasizing the state’s interest in potential life.
Whether that distinction ultimately remains confined to abortion remains the subject of considerable legal debate.
Justice Clarence Thomas separately suggested reconsideration of several substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell.
The majority expressly declined to adopt that position.
Nevertheless, the conversation has begun.
Cognitive Liberty and the Next Frontier
My work increasingly focuses on a concept sometimes described as cognitive liberty.
At its core, cognitive liberty asks a simple question:
Who controls the mind?
As technology becomes more immersive, personalized, predictive, and persuasive, questions involving privacy increasingly intersect with questions involving autonomy itself.
Parents now confront challenges unimaginable to the courts that decided Meyer, Pierce, or even Troxel.
Algorithmic recommendation systems, behavioral profiling, biometric technologies, artificial intelligence, and immersive digital environments increasingly shape how children learn, communicate, and form beliefs.
The legal system has traditionally protected family autonomy from excessive government interference.
The next challenge may be determining how that autonomy survives in an era where both governmental and private actors possess unprecedented influence over information environments.
The question is no longer simply whether government may enter the family sphere.
The question is whether meaningful parental autonomy can exist when outside institutions possess extraordinary technological capacity to influence behavior, attention, and decision-making.
The Larger Constitutional Question
At its heart, the debate surrounding Dobbs is not solely about abortion.
Nor is Troxel solely about grandparent visitation.
Both cases ultimately concern the same constitutional inquiry:
How much authority does government possess over deeply personal decisions?
The answer affects reproductive rights.
It affects parental rights.
It affects family integrity.
It affects privacy.
And increasingly, it affects emerging discussions surrounding cognitive liberty and human autonomy in the digital age.
The constitutional conversation unfolding today is larger than any single case.
It is a debate about the meaning of liberty itself.
The outcome will shape not only how we raise our children and govern our families, but how future generations understand the relationship between individual freedom and governmental power.
Disclaimer
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Reading this article does not create an attorney-client relationship. Individuals facing specific legal issues should consult qualified counsel regarding their particular circumstances.
Cognitive Liberty Notice
About the Author
California Attorney and Shareholder at Los Angeles-based family law firm Castellanos & Associates, APLC. Sally focuses on writing about legal issues at the intersection of children’s privacy, global data protection, and the impact of media and technology on families.
This article reflects ongoing research and commentary regarding privacy, autonomy, technology, constitutional law, and cognitive liberty. References to cognitive liberty concern emerging legal and ethical discussions involving freedom of thought, mental privacy, individual autonomy, and the impact of technology on human decision-making.